A Treaty Built on 1988's River: Why India Must Renegotiate the Ganges Deal, Not Roll It Over

The Treaty Is Expiring, but So Is the River It Was Written For The 1996

Ganges treaty shares water using a schedule built on flows recorded between 1949 and 1988. That design is now the core problem. The river has changed, demand has grown on both sides and climate variability has made the old averages unreliable. Before asking whether India and Bangladesh can agree, it helps to see what each side actually wants.

The Interest Map

Bangladesh wants a new deal that accounts for climate change and the whole basin, not just Farakka. Its lean-season stakes are high. The Ganges-Kobadak irrigation project, designed for 955 sq km, now reportedly covers 550 sq km.

The Gorai carries Ganges freshwater into the Sundarbans and holds back saltwater. Dhaka also has alternatives it can signal: it approved the $2.8 billion Padma Barrage in May 2026 and Chinese financing has been proposed for its Teesta project. New Delhi wants a predictable eastern neighbourhood and no strategic opening for China near the Siliguri Corridor.

But the timing is awkward. Sheikh Hasina, who signed the 1996 treaty, is living in India, has been sentenced to death in absentia in Bangladesh and says she will return in December. Engaging Dhaka's new government on her signature treaty while she remains India's guest is politically delicate. Bihar and West Bengal have their own concerns.

Bihar argues that guaranteeing downstream flows worsens its own cycle of floods and dry spells. West Bengal's opposition has stalled the Teesta deal since 2011 and Farakka exists to send water down the Hooghly to keep Kolkata's port navigable.

Why a Rollover Will Not Work

The treaty has no automatic extension clause; it can be renewed only by mutual consent. Even an agreed extension would carry forward the old flaw. Studies of flows from 1997 to 2016 suggest Bangladesh did not receive its guaranteed share about 65 per cent of the time during the critical March to May period.

A schedule that fails most of the time in the months that matter does not build trust, whatever the text says. The 1989-1996 gap shows the cost of having no treaty at all. After the 1977 agreement and later short-term understandings lapsed, there was no operational sharing mechanism for eight years.

A Bangladeshi river group says at least three rivers nearly dried up in that period and demand on both sides is far higher today.

Where the Balance Sits

The strategic logic favours India moving first. A renewal negotiated with the new government, rather than inherited from the old one, would show that India's Neighbourhood First policy works with Bangladesh as a country, not with any one party.

A modern treaty could update the flow data, add climate and drought clauses and widen cooperation to the basin, which would address Dhaka's main demand. Domestically, Article 253 lets Parliament implement international agreements even on State List subjects like water.

The Centre should still consult Bihar and West Bengal openly, so that the treaty is not stalled again as the Teesta deal was.

Why This Matters for the Exam The

Ganges treaty shows that water diplomacy fails less often over principle than over outdated design and domestic politics. For GS2, the useful lesson is that renewal is not a technical formality. It is a test of whether India can turn a deadline into a reset.