Coexistence With China Is Possible - But Only With Deterrence Behind the Diplomacy

Coexistence Needs Both a Handshake and a Wall

India can coexist peacefully with China. But it cannot do so by treating China's military threat as a myth. Peace now depends on diplomacy that rests on credible deterrence.

The reasoning For three decades, India's China policy rested on a bargain struck during Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to Beijing: keep the boundary dispute in one box and let trade, culture and diplomacy grow outside it. The bargain was written into law-like texts. The 1993 agreement on peace and tranquillity and the 2005 Guiding Principles, both say in Article I that neither side will use or threaten force against the other. Then came June 2020. In the Galwan Valley, 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the first deadly clash on the LAC in decades. Whatever the causes, the result is clear: a written pledge against force did not stop force. The bargain that kept the border separate from everything else broke. If agreements alone could not hold, something else must stand behind them. That something is deterrence: enough military presence and preparedness that any attempt to change the LAC by force would fail or cost too much to try.

The strongest counter-argument The best case against this position comes from M.K.

Narayanan himself - and from his own record. He was the Special Representative who signed the 2005 principles. That agreement and the 1988 approach before it, kept the border largely quiet for decades without the heavy deterrence India now maintains.

He also argues that neither side gains from war: conflict would derail China's ambition to become the leading world power by 2049. In the high Himalayas, he says, neither army has a decisive edge. And treating China as an existential threat, together with India's role in the US-backed Quad, persuades Beijing that India is part of a containment plan - which hardens its position.

On this view, a threat posture is self-fulfilling. Diplomacy worked before; it can work again. This is a serious argument. It is built on real experience and it is right that neither side wants war.

Why the

position still holds The counter-argument shows that diplomacy can keep peace. It does not show that diplomacy alone will. Its own evidence - decades of calm under the 1988 and 2005 frameworks - ended at Galwan, while those frameworks were still formally in force.

The argument proves the value of agreements, but not that agreements are enough. The argument from mutual interest also proves less than it appears. Precisely because neither side wants full war, small, deniable pressure along an undefined LAC becomes tempting.

Deterrence is what makes that pressure pointless. And the October 2024 understanding that restored patrolling in Depsang and Demchok came after years of a matched military standoff. Diplomacy delivered - with deterrence behind it.

TAN's position therefore stands: coexistence is the goal, diplomacy is the method and deterrence is the condition that makes both credible.