Speaking for the Constitution, Not for the Verdict: The Line Justice Bhuyan's Speech Tests

Three Questions Every Judge Must Ask Before Speaking in Public

Imagine you are the judge at that podium. The students in front of you will soon argue cases on rights and citizenship. You believe, as a matter of constitutional conviction, that the right to vote is the foundation of the republic.

You also know that petitions about electoral roll revisions are pending in your own court. Silence would feel like abdication. Speech might feel like a verdict delivered outside the courtroom.

The rule the judiciary set for itself The Supreme Court's own Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, adopted in 1997, states the standard plainly.

Clause 1 says: "Justice must not merely be done but it must also be seen to be done." Clause 8 says judges shall not express views in public on matters "pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination." The Bangalore Principles draw the same line from both sides:

• Principle 4.11 lets judges lecture and teach on law.
• Principle 2.4 restrains comments that might reasonably affect proceedings before them. So the question is never simply "may a judge speak?" It is what, how specifically and how close to a live case.

Applying three tests to the NALSAR address

1. Subject. Justice Bhuyan spoke on the constitutional status of the vote, drawing on Article 326 and the Court's own precedents. That is classic constitutional teaching, well within Principle 4.11.
2. Specificity. He went further, saying that any process disenfranchising millions would be intrinsically arbitrary, that no authority could do it and no court could condone it. The claim was conditional, but its second half speaks directly to what courts may do with exactly the kind of dispute now before them.
3. Proximity. SIR litigation was pending in the Supreme Court. He did not name the SIR, but the timing made the connection unmistakable to everyone listening.

Both sides carry real weight Former CJI B.R.

Gavai, with retired judges S.N. Dhingra and R.S. Sodhi, argued that judicial propriety bars a sitting judge from commenting on a matter pending before his court. Former judges Abhay Oka and Gopala Gowda found no impropriety, holding that judges may speak on constitutional principles. Comparative practice shows the line is calibrated, not absolute:

• Justice Antonin Scalia criticised a lower-court Pledge of Allegiance ruling in 2003, then stayed off the case when it reached the US Supreme Court.
• Lady Hale outlined the arguments in the pending Brexit case in 2016, stopped short of a view and later sat in Miller.

Where this lands On these tests, the subject passed, the proximity was high and the specificity was borderline.

The constitutionally careful course is to keep speaking on principles, stop short of declaring what courts can or cannot condone and, if the precise question arrives on your bench, step aside as Scalia did. For the exam, the insight is that judicial restraint is not silence. It is the discipline of separating teaching from deciding.