Summary
In an Indian Express column, Ishan Bakshi argues that the RBI has spent months fighting three battles at once: inflation, a falling rupee and rising bond yields. The MPC raised the repo rate by 25 basis points to 5.50% in October and shifted to calibrated tightening, while projecting that inflation will peak at 6.0% in the third quarter.
That would leave real rates negative. The RBI drew on reserves and used financial engineering to steady the rupee and on October 21 it rejected all bids at a ₹23,000 crore T-bill auction rather than pay higher yields. Last week the rupee firmed, yields fell and FPIs returned, with custodian data showing net equity purchases of about ₹38,971 crore in the week of November 2-6.
TAN's position: the relief came from cheaper oil, lower US yields and an AI-stock correction, not from policy. The trilemma forces a choice and the RBI's statutory inflation mandate should win, with the rupee left to absorb shocks.
WHY IT MATTERS FOR UPSC & STATE PCS
An Indian Express column argues that the RBI's simultaneous defence of inflation, the rupee and bond yields lacks coherence. It comes as a week of external relief, from falling oil prices and US yields, eased pressure on Indian markets after a delayed October rate hike.
Standard News
Inflation First, the Rupee Second **The
RBI cannot win against inflation, the rupee and bond yields all at the same time and it should stop trying. When it must choose, the law already tells it what to choose: inflation.**
The Logic of the Trilemma
International economics has a simple rule called the trilemma. A country with open capital flows cannot control both its interest rate and its exchange rate. Pick one and markets set the other. Over the past months the RBI has tried to have it all.
It raised the repo rate only in October, by 25 basis points to 5.50 per cent, while expecting inflation to peak at 6.0 per cent in the third quarter. On its own projection, the real interest rate is negative. At the same time it spent reserves and used financial engineering to steady the rupee.
It also rejected every bid at a ₹23,000 crore T-bill auction on October 21 rather than accept the higher yields investors wanted. These three goals undercut each other. Negative real rates push capital out and weaken the rupee.
Defending the rupee drains reserves and liquidity. Holding yields down tells investors that inflation may not be the top priority. Each tool is fighting another. Scale matters too. The BIS estimates daily rupee turnover at about $185 billion.
Reserves can smooth a bad day, but they cannot hold a price against a market of that size for months.
The Strongest Objection
The best counter-argument is serious. India's currency market is not as deep as those of the dollar or euro. If the rupee falls in a disorderly way, imported prices jump. India imports about 85 per cent of its crude oil, so a weaker rupee means dearer fuel, fertiliser and freight.
That is imported inflation. On this view, defending the rupee is inflation targeting, because a disorderly fall would push inflation through the band faster than any rate hike could stop it.
Why the Position Still Holds
The objection is right about disorder and wrong about direction. There is a real difference between smoothing sharp, panicky moves and resisting a fall driven by fundamentals. The first is legitimate and cheap. The second fights the market with a policy rate that is pushing the other way.
The objection's own logic actually favours tighter policy. The most powerful defence against imported inflation is a positive real interest rate, because it both slows domestic prices and makes rupee assets attractive.
Raising rates earlier would have helped the rupee and inflation together. Selling reserves while keeping real rates negative helped neither for long. And last week's relief proves the point. The rupee firmed, yields fell and FPIs bought about ₹38,971 crore of equities in the week of November 2-6, as reported.
But that followed Brent falling below $98, lower US yields and a correction in AI stocks. Policy did not change; the world did. If oil spikes again, the same pressures return. For the exam, remember: under the trilemma, a central bank that refuses to choose ends up having the choice made for it by markets. Section 45ZA has already made the choice.
The RBI should follow it.
Quick Facts
Key numbers & takeaways — revise these first
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The MPC unanimously raised the repo rate by 25 basis points to 5.50% in October 2026 and shifted its stance to calibrated tightening.
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The RBI expects CPI inflation to peak at 6.0% in Q3.
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Section 45ZA of the RBI Act provides for an inflation target; the government retained 4% with a 2-6% band for 2026-31.
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On October 21, 2026, the RBI rejected all bids at a ₹23,000 crore T-bill auction as investors sought higher returns.
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Daily rupee turnover in onshore and offshore markets was about $185 billion in 2025, per the BIS.
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In June 2026 the RBI revived an FCNR(B) deposit scheme, bearing the hedging cost, to attract NRI dollars.
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In 2013, the FCNR(B) swap window helped bring nearly $34 billion of NRI deposit inflows in FY14.
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Brent crude fell below $98 a barrel after the US midterm elections; US bond yields also fell.
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Custodian data showed FPIs as net buyers of about ₹38,971 crore in Indian equities in the week of November 2-6, 2026.
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India imports about 85% of its crude oil requirement.
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The macroeconomic trilemma holds that a country cannot have a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows and independent monetary policy at the same time.
Connect the dots for your UPSC preparation.
Standard news covers the event. Log in to read our comprehensive analysis and uncover the hidden constitutional, structural, and ethical dimensions of this topic:
A step-by-step working of the trilemma showing how negative real rates, reserve sales and capped yields cancel each other out
The strongest case for currency defence, built on shallow markets and imported oil inflation, argued at full strength
Why the distinction between smoothing disorder and resisting fundamentals answers that case and why positive real rates defend the rupee better than reserves
How the 2013 and 2026 FCNR(B) schemes show what intervention can buy and what it cannot
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