Summary
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth held bilateral talks on 28 October 2026 in Cebu, Philippines, on the sidelines of the 13th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus. As reported, they reviewed progress under the 10-year Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership, signed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025.
They discussed the implementation of foundational agreements, technology sharing, defence-industrial integration, maritime security and resilient supply chains. Singh called for zero tolerance towards nations that support, train or fund terrorist groups and thanked the US for its support against cross-border terrorism and Hegseth reaffirmed that support.
Hegseth marked the framework's first anniversary and Singh described the partnership as a cornerstone of a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific.
WHY IT MATTERS FOR UPSC & STATE PCS
India and the United States reviewed the first year of their 10-year defence framework at the ADMM-Plus in Cebu. The meeting shows deepening cooperation on technology and information-sharing, while India's insistence on zero tolerance for state sponsors of terrorism points to a long-standing friction in the relationship: Washington's military ties with Pakistan.
Standard News
Two Tracks, One Washington: Why India Keeps Saying "Zero Tolerance" to a Partner At
Cebu, both sides said what a maturing partnership is supposed to say. India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reviewed the first year of the 10-year Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership, signed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025.
As reported, they covered technology sharing, information sharing, defence-industrial integration and maritime security. Hegseth reaffirmed support for India against cross-border terrorism. The official language is the data, not the explanation. The explanation lies in what each side wants and what each side will not give up.
The interest map -
What Washington wants from India: a capable partner in the Indo-Pacific that can co-produce equipment, share information and absorb American defence technology. The framework is built for exactly that.
- What Washington will not give up: a military channel to Pakistan. The US has supplied Pakistan with F-16s since the 1980s and still sees value in Pakistani cooperation on counter-terrorism and regional access.
- What India wants: technology, co-production and unambiguous solidarity on terrorism emanating from across its borders.
- What India will not give up: strategic autonomy. New Delhi will not become an ally, will not accept that its partner's arms to Pakistan are none of its business and will not mute its objections to keep the atmosphere warm.
The track India cannot ignore The friction is not hypothetical.
In September 2022, the US approved a $450 million sustainment package for Pakistan's F-16 fleet and justified it as supporting counter-terrorism interoperability. Rajnath Singh conveyed India's concern to then Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a phone call.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar went further in public, dismissing the counter-terrorism rationale and pointing out that everyone knows against whom the jets are positioned. Read against that history, Singh's call at Cebu for zero tolerance towards nations that support, train or fund terrorist groups is not boilerplate.
It is a reminder delivered inside a celebration: India's support for the partnership is conditioned on Washington not treating Pakistan as a counter-terrorism partner.
Where the
balance sits On balance, convergence is real but bounded. The structure of cooperation keeps thickening: four foundational agreements, a 2023 roadmap for defence-industrial cooperation and now a ten-year framework. That structure survived even the strain of US tariffs on Indian goods in 2025, when the two ministers still met and signed the framework.
But the relationship runs on two tracks. One builds the India-US partnership. The other preserves America's options with Pakistan. India's choice is not to break with either track. It is to keep accepting the first while refusing to stay silent on the second.
For GS2, Cebu is a clean example of what strategic autonomy looks like in practice. It is not distance from the US. It is deep cooperation combined with the freedom to name, every time, the interest a partner would prefer India ignored.
Quick Facts
Key numbers & takeaways — revise these first
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The 13th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus was held in Cebu, Philippines, on 28 and 29 October 2026.
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ADMM-Plus brings together the 10 ASEAN member states and 8 dialogue partners, including India and the United States.
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ADMM-Plus was first convened in 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam.
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The Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025.
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India and the US have signed four foundational defence agreements: GSOMIA (2002), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020).
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The United States recognised India as a Major Defence Partner in 2016.
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In September 2022, the US approved a $450 million F-16 sustainment package for Pakistan, which included no new capabilities, weapons or munitions.
Connect the dots for your UPSC preparation.
Standard news covers the event. Log in to read our comprehensive analysis and uncover the hidden constitutional, structural, and ethical dimensions of this topic:
A full interest map of Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad, including what each cannot be seen doing publicly.
How the four foundational agreements and the 2023 roadmap feed into the 2025 framework and what the Cebu review actually measured.
The 2022 F-16 sustainment episode as a case study in the limits of convergence.
A way forward that deepens co-production while building guardrails against the US-Pakistan channel.
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