Speed or Legitimacy: Why Cooperative Federalism Needs a Room of Its Own

A Council Without a Calendar: Why India's Federal Bargains Need a Neutral Table India's

Constitution anticipated that the Union and the States would need a place to argue things out. Article 263 lets the President set up a council to inquire into and discuss subjects of common interest and recommend better coordination of policy.

For more than four decades after Independence, that council did not exist. It was finally set up in 1990, on the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation. Since then it has met only irregularly, with gaps of several years, including a decade-long gap before its 11th meeting in 2016.

That matters now. After the 84th Amendment's freeze, India must decide how to redistribute Lok Sabha seats among States after the first Census after 2026. Few decisions shape federal trust more. Shashi Tharoor, writing in The Indian Express, argues that it should not be settled in Parliament alone and that the Inter-State Council should be revived as the forum for such negotiations.

The case for the current approach The Centre's preference for specialised, executive-led forums has a serious logic.

• The GST Council works. Created under Article 279A, it has real decision-making powers and has met many times since 2017. Focused bodies with clear mandates deliver results.
• NITI Aayog's Governing Council and Zonal Councils already bring Chief Ministers together on development and regional issues.
• Delimitation is constitutionally Parliament's task. Article 82 provides for readjustment after each Census through a law made by Parliament. A general-purpose council could become a venue for delay on a decision the Constitution assigns elsewhere. On this view, reviving a broad, irregular council would add a talking shop, not legitimacy.

The case for a revived Council The opposing argument is stronger in this specific moment.

• Delimitation is a contest between States. It will reallocate representation between States that controlled population growth and those that did not. When the deciding body is shaped by the very States that stand to gain, its neutrality is questioned.
• Trust needs a regular, neutral place. The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions both saw the Council as the missing link in India's federal design. Punchhi recommended it meet at least three times a year.
• Specialised forums are chaired by the Centre. They manage implementation, not the political bargains that sit underneath it.

Where this leaves us TAN's position is that the Inter-State Council should be revived as an autonomous body, with its own secretariat and a fixed calendar and that the principles of post-2026 delimitation should be discussed there before any legislation. This does not give States a veto. Parliament keeps its constitutional role. But a decision that redistributes power among States should be preceded by structured consultation among them. Australia's National Cabinet, created in 2020, shows that regular meetings of heads of government can make federal coordination routine rather than exceptional. What would change our view? If a revived Council became a forum for indefinite obstruction rather than negotiation. The answer to that risk is fixed timelines, not silence. Cooperative federalism is a promise; the Council is where it can be kept.