After Kulgam Killings, J&K Moves to Cluster Migrant Workers - But Is That Solving the Right Problem?

THE TACTICAL SHIFT BEHIND THE KULGAM KILLINGS THAT THE CLUSTER PLAN DOESN'T ADDRESS

Two unarmed brick kiln workers killed with no military or strategic value to the killers, at a moment when the Valley has otherwise seen a peaceful Amarnath Yatra and a well-turned-out state election two years ago - this attack makes little sense as an attempt to reclaim territory or inflict serious damage.

What it does make sense as is a calculated move to stay violent enough to matter, while staying small enough to avoid the retaliation a larger attack would invite. In practice, that means J&K's response - clustering migrant labourers, adding patrols - is fixing where the violence lands, not why the attackers chose that particular target.

What Actually Changed

For years, high-casualty attacks on security convoys or camps were the default template - visible, symbolic and guaranteed to draw a major counter-terror response. Killing two migrant labourers draws headlines and instils fear, but doesn't cross the threshold that triggers the kind of large-scale operation a barracks attack would.

That is the calculus: minimum casualties, maximum psychological effect, minimum retaliatory risk. Roughly 25 migrant deaths over six years is not a random pattern - it's a low, steady rate consistent with a group deliberately avoiding escalation while sustaining a narrative of instability.

Where the Cluster Response Falls Short

Consolidating migrant workers into secure clusters optimises how security forces can protect a scattered, mobile population - but it treats the location of the vulnerability, not the incentive structure that makes soft targets attractive in the first place.

As long as attacking unarmed civilians remains lower-risk than attacking security installations, clustering shifts where an attack might happen next; it doesn't remove the reason this tactic was chosen over any other. A genuinely calculus-altering response would need to raise the cost of soft-target attacks specifically - sustained human intelligence penetration of TRF/LeT cells, not just visible patrolling that a target-selecting group can simply route around.

The Harder Question

If terror groups have consciously shifted toward vulnerable non-combatants precisely because it's lower-risk, then physical security measures alone will always be one step behind - they protect against yesterday's attack, not tomorrow's target selection.

The real test of J&K's response isn't whether this specific cluster plan prevents another Kulgam; it's whether the underlying intelligence and deterrence architecture changes enough that soft-target killings stop being the rational choice they currently are.

For the exam, this is the sharper reading: administrative relocation is a symptom-level fix to a tactic-level problem and evaluating security policy in J&K now means asking whether it changes the attacker's calculus, not just the geography of the target.