The State Law Waiting on a Desk: How Article 254(2) Assent Became a Union Filter

Assent Without a Clock: The Silence Inside Article

254(2) Article 254(2) says that a State law which conflicts with a Central law on a Concurrent List subject will prevail in that State if it "has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent." That is the rule as written. As practised, the assent is decided by a Union ministry, with no deadline and no duty to give reasons.

The

Rule as Written Article 254 is the Constitution's rule for resolving conflict. Clause (1) says that when a Central law and a State law on a Concurrent List subject clash, the Central law wins. Clause (2) is the exception: a State can override the Central law within its own territory if the President agrees.

The Supreme Court has explained what that agreement involves. In Kaiser-I-Hind v. National Textile Corporation (2002), it held that the word "consideration" requires an active application of mind. The assent covers only the Central laws the State has specifically pointed out as conflicting and it is not an empty formality.

The framers built Clause (2) as a safety valve: a way for States to adjust national criminal and civil law to local conditions.

The

Rule as Practised West Bengal's anti-goonda Bill shows how the safety valve actually works. One provision would make a bailable offence linked to the NDPS Act, carrying a three-year prison term, non-bailable in Bengal. Because bail is part of criminal procedure, a Concurrent subject, the Bill needs Article 254(2) assent.

Three structural facts decide what happens next. First, "the President" in practice means the Union government. Under Article 74, the President acts on ministerial advice, so the Bill is being examined, by the Chief Minister's own account, at the joint secretary level of the Home Ministry. Second, there is no deadline. In November 2025, a Constitution Bench answering a Presidential Reference held that courts cannot impose timelines on the Governor or President for assent, rejected the idea of "deemed assent" and treated the President's decision under Article 201 as non-justiciable. Third, there is no duty to give reasons. Kaiser-I-Hind requires the President to consider the conflict properly, but nothing requires the reasons to be shared with the State.

Why This Silence Matters

The gap here is a constitutional silence, not an accident of drafting. The framers wanted flexibility in Centre-State legislative relations and left Article 254(2) open-ended. What they may not have foreseen is that a State's power to adapt Central criminal law would come to depend on the internal workings of one Union ministry, with the State unable to track the process, contest it or hear the reasons.

Whether Bengal's Bill is sound criminal law is a separate question and the Union has legitimate reasons to protect uniformity in bail rules. But the principle applies to every State: an exception with no clock and no reasons works less as a safety valve and more as a veto held by the Union executive.

For the exam: read Article 254(2) not as a neutral tie-breaker between laws but as a point of Union executive control. Kaiser-I-Hind (active consideration) and the 2025 advisory opinion (no timelines) together explain why.